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A long history of conflict surrounds the scope of copyright protec-
tion within the content industries,' and the music industry is no excep-
tion. Invariably, these conflicts arise as a result of new technologies that
threaten the copyright holder's ability to restrict reproduction, distribu-
tion, and ultimate control of a work.2 This conflict has manifested itself
both within the different branches of the music industry3 and between the
industry and the consuming public.4
. J.D. magna cum laude, 2005, Seattle University School of Law; B.M. DePaul University School of
Music, 2002. The author thanks her family for their support, Dave for his infinite patience, Nessa
and Loki for their relentless encouragement, and the members of the Seattle University Law Review,
particularly Catherine Vuong, Article Editor, for thoughtful criticisms and helpful suggestions.
1. "Content industries" include movie, television, home video, music, software, and computer
gaming industries. William S. Coates, PLI Order No. GO-0 I1H (2002).
2. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) ("From the
advent of the player piano, every new means of reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with
musical copyright owners, often resulting in federal litigation."); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2001) ("The
relationship of copyright to new technologies that exploit copyrighted works is often perceived to pit
copyright against progress.").
3. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (record label
sued provider of online peer-to-peer network that was primarily used to share music files for con-
tributory infringement); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (broadcaster alleged
illegal price fixing in the form of blanket licensing against performing rights societies); Miller Music
Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (music publisher sued another music pub-
lisher for copyright infringement); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)
(copyright holders sued manufacturers of player pianos for copyright infringement).
4. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
717 (5th ed. 2002) ("Private uses of copyrighted works have presented a persisting challenge to
copyright law.").
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The first copyright struggles arising from new technologies divided
the music industry from within and threatened to shift control of copy-
righted works in favor of nontraditional, competing distribution formats. 5
For example, the development of player pianos at the turn of the century
pitted music publishers against manufacturers of the then-new player
piano.6 Similarly, the development of radio caused record labels and re-
cording artists to worry about how they would collect royalties in the
new media.7 Each of these new technologies was, at one point, thought to
infringe upon the rights of intellectual property holders so egregiously
that proliferation of the technology might mean an effective end to intel-
lectual property rights' protection. 8 Despite the development and prolif-
eration of each new technology, however, the industry survived and
grew.9
With the advent of home recording, the scope of the conflict shifted
away from internal conflict and toward a new threat: the consumer.
Home audio and video recording enabled consumers to make multiple
copies of a protected work, at the same time possibly infringing on the
copyright holder's exclusive right to reproduce those works.10 With each
new technological innovation, users were able to make more uses of
copyrighted works at the expense of the copyright holders' control over
content.1' More recently, digital copying and distribution technology,
including P2P networks, 12 "ripping" software, 3 and other digital copying
5. See KIMBERLY L. CRAFT, TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MUSIC
BUSINESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 122-123 (2001).
6. See Apollo, 209 U.S. at 9-12.
7. CRAFT, supra note 5, at 48. Interestingly, as history played out, terrestrial radio broadcasters
never had to pay royalties to record labels to play their sound recordings over the air. Kimberly L.
Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, As Soon As We Figure Out the Copy-
right Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 6
(2001).
8. For a complete discussion of the history of conflicts surrounding the technology-copyright
debate, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-69 (2001).
9. In 2001, copyright industries accounted for $535 billion, or 5.2% of the gross domestic
product of the United States. INT'L FED'N OF PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, IFPI MUSIC PIRACY
REPORT 1 (2002), at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2004). As one article points out, "Based on the specious statistics [the content industries] cite, it is
likely that even the industry folks know that digital technologies will increase the total size of the
pie. They fear instead that their relative slice will shrink without strong [digital rights management
technology]." Megan E. Gray, The Legal Fallout from Digital Rights Management Technology, 20
NO. 4 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 20, 21 (2002).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (Supp. 2002); see generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.I 1 (1984).
11. See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1614 ("With the arrival of [new] technologies, the . . . bal-
ance [of control] substantially shifted to users.").
12. "P2P" is short for "peer-to-peer." The phrase "P2P network" describes a kind of network in
which Intemet users connect directly to one another's computers in order to share files. These files
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technologies, threatened copyright holders' control over protected works.
The industry reacted by lobbying for the enactment of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA").
14
Among other things, the DMCA outlawed the use or importation of
tools that others use to circumvent copy-protection measures that copy-
right owners have installed in their content.' 5 However, the DMCA pro-
visions disallowing copy protection and the importation of circumvention
tools endow copyright holders with far too much power to control their
works because those provisions prevent fair uses of those works. Con-
gress must amend the DMCA to restore the balance of power between
the content providers and the public by creating a meaningful fair use
defense in the digital age.
This Comment first explains the evolution of the fair use doctrine,
which historically prevented copyright holders from having too much
control over their works by allowing certain legal and noninfringing fair
uses of protected works. Part II explains how the United States Supreme
Court developed the Betamax standard to apply the doctrine of fair use to
a new technology: home video recorders. Part II also addresses how fair
use and the Betamax standard might apply to digital technologies. Part
III explains how the DMCA effectively abolished the defense of fair use
and its application under the Betamax standard. Finally, Part IV con-
cludes that the fair use defense must co-exist with the DMCA in order to
maintain an appropriate balance of power between copyright owners and
the public. Part IV then proposes a solution for restoring that balance.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FAIR USE
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to Pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. 1 6 This clause endows Congress with the
power to grant monopolies, or copyrights, to authors for limited periods
of time.17 The monopoly may only extend as far as necessary in order to
may include copyrighted works such as music, books, and movies. See Peer-to-peer, in WIKIPEDIA:
THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P2p (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
13. "Ripping" is the process by which a digital audio, visual, or audiovisual file is copied from
external media-a CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, CD, or floppy disk-onto the hard drive of a computer.
See Ripping, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ripping (last
visited Mar. 23, 2005).
14. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
17. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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"Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 18 Thus, Congress's
power is limited to serving the purpose of promoting progress.
This "purpose" language ensures that "copyright legislation ... un-
der the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that
the author has in his writings."' 19 Instead, the monopoly privileges that
Congress may authorize are "intended to motivate the creativity of au-
thors and inventors" 20 and induce authors to release those works to the
public, 2' ultimately allowing the public complete access to the product
after the monopoly period has expired.22 Thus, the monopoly "confers a
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary mono-
poly. '23 The reward to an individual author is merely "a secondary con-
sideration., 24 Overall, the copyright laws strive to balance the protection
of property rights, which encourage innovation and creativity, against the
public's interest in having access to the free flow of ideas and creative
works.2 5
In order to preserve the balance between property rights and the
public's interest in access, copyright law has never granted a copyright
owner complete control of his work;26 control is limited even during the
monopoly period.27 Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, a copyright holder's control
is limited to five exclusive rights during the monopoly period, or six
where the copyright is in a sound recording. 28 Those exclusive rights are
the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute
copies of the work, perform the work publicly, display the work publicly,
29and perform a sound recording publicly through digital transmission.
The rights granted in § 106 are explicitly limited not only to the terms of
the list itself, but also by §§ 107-122.30 Notably absent from the list of
exclusive rights is the copyright holder's right to control fair uses.3 1
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (citing H.R. REP. No.
60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
20. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
21. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
22. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
23. Id. at 429 n.10 (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
24. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158.
25. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
26. Id. at 433 n.13.
27. Id. at 431-32.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 2002).
29. Id.
30. Id. (granting rights "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122").
31. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 (explaining that "the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive
right to such a [fair] use").
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The concept of fair use first evolved as a judicial doctrine 32 as early
as 1841, 33 and although it is not constitutionally mandated,34 "some op-
portunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought neces-
sary to fulfill copyright's very purpose [of] 'promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' ,35 Fair use developed after the courts found
that rights granted under the pre-1976 versions of the Act were broad
enough to encompass almost any possible activity associated with a
copyrighted work.36 Consequently, the courts consistently refused to read
the statute strictly 37 and instead developed the doctrine of fair use by rec-
ognizing a class of exceptions to the exclusive rights in copyrighted
works. 38 Congress first acquiesced in the application of the fair use doc-
trine by doing nothing to counteract it, and then in 1976, Congress ex-
plicitly ratified the doctrine by codifying the fair use exception in the
Copyright Act of 1976.39
32. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 (explaining
that the doctrine of fair use was originally a judicial doctrine that was not codified until 1976).
33. The first judicial finding of noninfringement for a fair use in the United States occurred in
1841 in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841); however, the term "fair use" did not
appear in case law until 1869, in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C. Mass. 1869). The con-
cept is not wholly original to U.S. jurisprudence, however. Fair use doctrine had its earliest begin-
nings in English cases interpreting the Statute of Anne. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
34. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Supreme
Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required.").
35. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Sony, 464 U.S. 417
(asserting that Congress confers copyright privileges "to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward").
36. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447 n.29.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
38. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (recognizing
singing in the shower and listening to the radio within a commercial establishment where the listen-
ing is for private enjoyment as noninfringing uses of copyrighted works).
39. Pub. L. No. 94-553, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)). The current version of § 107
provides the following:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particu-
lar case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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When Congress enacted § 107 as part of the Copyright Act of 1976,
it emphasized that future advances in technology demand an elastic for-
mulation of fair use.4 ° It explained that "there is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technologi-
cal change.' Congress's decision proved prudent and, as technology
has developed, the fair use test has been adapted, interpreted, and cus-
tomized to fit new technologies.4 2 In 1984, with the development of per-
sonal video recording devices, the Court dramatically adapted the fair
use test when it adopted the Betamax standard.4 3
II. THE BETAMAX STANDARD
The Betamax standard developed as a result of litigation between
Universal Studios and Disney on one side and Sony on the other. This
section will first examine the development of the Betamax standard, and
then it will turn to a discussion on the application of the Betamax stan-
dard today, more than twenty years after it was first developed in Sony v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.
A. Sony v. Universal City Studios
In 1969, Sony developed the Betamax, a video tape recorder that
could be used at home to record television programs onto magnetic
tape.44 Sony began marketing the Betamax to the public for home use in
1975; 45 soon after, Universal and Disney filed suit. The claim against
Sony was that Betamax users were infringing television and movie copy-
rights and that Sony was contributorily liable for that infringement.46 The
Court made two significant holdings with respect to fair use. First, the
sale of equipment capable of copyright infringement is not contributory
infringement if that equipment is capable of "substantial noninfringing
uses." 47 Second, creating unauthorized copies of television broadcasts for
48personal use at a later time is a fair use of those broadcasts.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
41. Id.
42. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
43. See id.; see also discussion infra at notes 44-97 and accompanying text.
44. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420. The video tape recorder is similar to a video cassette recorder.
CRAFT, supra note 5, at 23.
45. Sony, 464 U.S. at 419.
46. Id. at 420.
47. Id. at 442.
48. Id. at 454-55
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1. Sale of Equipment Capable of "Substantial
Noninfringing Uses" Not Contributory Infringement
The Court's first conclusion, that the sale of equipment capable of
"substantial noninfringing uses" is not contributory infringement, was
based upon an analogy to patent law. 4 9 Because the Copyright Act of
1976 was silent on the issue of contributory infringement, the Court
looked to patent law's clear definition of contributory infringement for
guidance. 50 Analogizing to patent law, Sony not only established a con-
tributory infringement cause of action in copyright law, but it also de-
fined the scope of liability for contributory infringement.5'
In patent law, "[t]he prohibition against contributory infringement
cannot be extended to the sale of a staple article or commodity of com-
merce that is suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 52 The Court in
Sony borrowed the "substantial noninfringing use" standard from patent
law, holding that anyone selling equipment capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses was not liable as a contributory copyright infringer.53 To
save Sony from liability, therefore, it was enough that one use of the Be-
tamax "plainly" satisfied the substantial noninfringing use standard: pri-
vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. 4
Home time-shifting 55 was considered a substantial noninfringing
use for two reasons. First, Disney and Universal alone had no right to
prevent other copyright holders from authorizing time-shifting of their
broadcasts.5 6 Disney's and Universal's programming each made up only
a fraction of the amount of total programming that viewers may wish to
record. 57 Sony presented substantial evidence that other copyright hold-
49. Id. at 434-35. Copyright law does not include a provision defining or disallowing contribu-
tory infringement. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified
as amended in 17 U.S.C. chs. 1-8 (2000)).
50. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c) defines contributory infringement of a patent as
follows: "Whoever sells a component of a patented machine ... or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process ... [which is] not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substan-
tial noninfinging use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. 2002).
51. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
52. § 271(c) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
53. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case, it
must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their
customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.").
54. Id. at 442.
55. "Time-shifting" is the process by which an individual will forego consuming-that is,
watching or listening to-an original broadcast and instead record the broadcast and consume it at a
later time. Nothing about the copyrighted work itself has actually changed, except the time at which
the consumer hears or views it. Id. at 423.
56. Id. at 442.
57. Id. at 443 n.22.
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ers authorized recording of their programs,5 8 specifically those holding
copyrights in sports, religious, and educational programming. 59 There-
fore, because the plaintiffs did "not represent a class composed of all
copyright holders" and a significant number of copyright holders wel-
comed the practice of time-shifting, the plaintiffs had no right to a rem-
edy that would deny the sale of "an article of commerce" that would pre-
vent other copyright holders from meaningfully authorizing time-
shifting.60 The second reason that home time-shifting was a substantial
noninfringing use was tied to the Court's second significant holding, that
home time-shifting is a fair use of a copyrighted work.
2. Unauthorized Home Time-Shifting As a Fair Use
The Court's second important holding with respect to fair use was
that unauthorized home time-shifting constituted fair use of a copy-
righted work.61 Applying the fair use balancing test in 17 U.S.C. § 107,
the Court found that the first factor, the purpose and character of the
work, clearly weighed in favor of a finding of fair use because time-
shifting for personal viewing was clearly a noncommercial use.62 The
second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, weighed in favor of a
finding of fair use because the broadcast was one that the viewer "had
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge. 63 The third factor,
the amount copied, may have weighed in favor of the copyright holders
if not for the nature of the works copied; 64 because the works were of-
fered in their entirety free of charge to begin with, "the fact that the en-
tire work is reproduced ... [did] not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use. 65
The Court went into greater detail in discussing the fourth factor,
the effect on the potential value of the work. It found that Universal and
Disney failed to fulfill their burden of demonstrating that "some mean-
ingful likelihood of future harm [to the value of Universal's and Disney's
copyrights] exist[ed]. 6 6 The Court supported its finding with a number
of observations. First, the Court observed that the plaintiffs had not dem-
67onstrated any past harm. Second, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs
58. Id. at 444-46.
59. Id. at 444.
60. Id. at 446.
61. Id. at 442.
62. Id. at 449.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 449-50.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 451.
67. Id. at 452.
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and their advertisers would likely benefit by the larger audience that
time-shifting allowed.68 Finally, the Court explained that the plaintiffs
provided no factual basis for their assertions that viewers would abandon
live television and movies in favor of Betamax tapes.6 9 Therefore, the
Court concluded that all four factors weighed in favor of a finding that
private, noncommercial time-shifting was a fair use.7 °
3. The Betamax Standard
Although users of Sony's Betamax were making unauthorized cop-
ies of Universal's and Disney's copyrighted television programs, the
Court found that Sony was not contributorily liable because the sale of
equipment capable of substantial noninfringing uses does not give rise to
contributory liability, and at least one use of the Betamax-private time-
shifting-was a noninfringing fair use. These two holdings constitute
what has become known as the Betamax standard.
Since the decision in Sony, courts have refined the analysis for de-
termining what constitutes contributory and vicarious copyright in-
fringement.71 The Betamax standard today makes up only a part of that
larger analysis. The current test for contributory infringement consists of
three elements: (1) direct infringement by a primary infringer; (2) knowl-
edge of the direct infringement on the part of the defendant; and (3) ma-
terial contribution to the direct infringement on the part of the defen-
dant.72
It is the knowledge element that requires a court today to engage in
a Betamax analysis. 73 Whether the Betamax standard applies will deter-
mine the level of knowledge that the plaintiff must demonstrate in order
to meet this element of the three-part contributory infringement test. 74 If
the technology at issue does not meet the Betamax standard of being ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses, then the plaintiff must demon-
strate only that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the in-
fringement.75 If the technology at issue does fulfill the Betamax standard
of being capable of substantial noninfringing uses, then the requisite
68. Id. at 454.
69. Id. at 452-53.
70. Id. at 454-55.
71. Compare id. at 417, with MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (explaining that Sony's standard is an element of the
larger contributory infringement analysis).
72. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
73. See id. at 1160-61 (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); A&M
Records v. Napster, 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002)).
74. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160-61.
75. Id. at 1161.
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level of knowledge to impose liability is "reasonable knowledge of spe-
cific infringing [content]," and the plaintiff must also prove that the de-
fendant "failed to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement., 76
The Betamax standard is alive and well today in current copyright
law. Sony demonstrated the flexibility of the doctrine of fair use, and the
Betamax standard has proved useful for many years. However, as tech-
nology continued to develop and new digital technologies challenged the
traditional distribution mediums of the content industries, Sony's Be-
tamax standard was put to the digital test.
B. Fair Use and Digital Technology
The fair use doctrine and the Betamax standard, as understood be-
fore the enactment of the DMCA, apply relatively simply to digital tech-
nologies. Illustrative digital technologies include digital music and mov-
ies on compact disc ("CD"), digital video disc ("DVD"), or computer
files (such as MP377 audio files), ebooks, digital video recorders, and
P2P networks. This section will briefly examine the possible fair uses of
those technologies and how the Betamax standard would have applied
before the enactment of the DMCA.
1. Fair Uses of Digital Technologies
Digital fair use commonly occurs in the educational setting. For ex-
ample, a professor displaying a scene from two different films to illus-
trate a point on cinematography would be engaging in a fair use of those
works. 78 The professor may copy each of those scenes onto a single me-
dium; for example, a single videotape in the analog classroom 79 or a sin-
gle DVD in the digital classroom. Whether the demonstration is recorded
onto analog video or digital video, the professor has engaged in a lawful
76. Id.
77. MP3 is short for "MPEG-I Audio Layer 3." Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys. Inc., 190 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999). It is the common name of a digital for-
mat for sound recordings that uses algorithms to compress audio files in order to make them smaller
and more manageable. Id. at 1073-74.
78. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see
also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 (providing examples
of fair use including "reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a
lesson").
79. An analog signal is one that uses a property of the medium itself to transmit information.
See Analog, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog (last
visited Mar. 23, 2005). In the case of traditional recording media, the medium is magnetic tape, and
the property that transmits information is the electrical property; thus, the varying electrical impulse
generated by the magnetized tape transmits audio from the media to the playing device. See id. This
differs from a digital format, where the information is encoded in binary code. Id. An "analog class-
room" would be a classroom using works fixed in an analog format; this is in contrast to a "digital
classroom," which would use works fixed in a digital format. Id.
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fair use of the work.80 Likewise, a schoolchild may make fair copies of a
page of a book to hand out to students as part of a presentation on literary
analysis.8' In the digital era, rather than making photocopies, the instruc-
tor could download from the Interet an electronic copy of the book, also
known as an "ebook," select the pages to print, and print the number of
copies needed. In both examples, the students receive the same end
product (the book page); the only difference is the source of each stu-
dent's copy.
Education is not the only setting in which a person may make fair
use of a digital work to the same effect as using an analog or traditional
version of a work. A library may fairly copy a portion of a work to re-
place a damaged or missing part of a lawfully acquired copy. 82 In the
digital age, rather than making a photocopy of the book, the library might
legally print out the damaged pages from an ebook copy of that same
work. Just as in the other examples, the process and the result are the
same because the library has replaced the damaged pages with fairly
made copies. Only the source of those copies is different: traditional on
the one hand, digital on the other.
Digital fair use may also occur in a commercial context. A social
commentator may fairly copy a part of a work in order to parody that
work,83 and the result is the same whether the parody was based on ana-
log or digital master recordings of the original. For example, a musical
group making a parody of an original song may copy parts of the song,
such as the accompaniment, in order to comment on it by inserting new
lyrics. 84 In the analog age, the parody could be created fairly by copying
the underlying musical accompaniment to the song from the master tape
(analog) recordings. 85 The end result of the digital parody is no different,
except that the parodist would use digital master recordings.
As the above examples illustrate, the fair use of copyrighted works
is the same whether the work being copied is embodied in a digital or
analog medium; only the source of the copy varies, and then only in for-
mat and not in content. Like the traditional fair use standards, the Be-
tamax standard is also applicable to digital media in cases of contributory
infringement.
80. See Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d at 322 ("[C]ertain uses. . . might qualify as 'fair' for pur-
poses of copyright infringement-for example, the preparation by a film studies professor of a single
CD-ROM or tape containing two scenes from different movies in order to illustrate a point in a lec-
ture on cinematography, as opposed to showing relevant parts of two different DVDs.").
81. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
83. Id.; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
84. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
85. See id.
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2. Betamax Uses of Digital Technologies
The most obvious application of the Betamax standard to digital
media is in the case of a digital video recorder ("DVR"). A DVR oper-
ates much like a VCR or video tape recorder ("VTR") by recording tele-
vision broadcasts for consumption, or viewing, at a later time.86 Rather
than recording onto an analog magnetic tape, however, a DVR records
digital information onto a hard drive. 87 Like the Betamax VTR, a DVR is
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and its manufacturers would
likely not be liable for contributory copyright infringement because its
users engage in a quintessential Betamax fair use-time-shifting-when
recording television broadcasts.88
Even P2P networks are most likely capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses,89 in which case owners of P2P networks may not be liable
for contributory infringement under the Betamax standard. That precise
86. See DVR, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DVR
(last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
87. See id.
88. Some articles have stressed potential new uses that DVRs might present in the future and
have pointed out that those potential uses might change the result of a Betamax analysis. See gener-
ally Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRs: Introducing
TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (2002). There is, however, no evidence that
these new features are widely used or even widely available, and thus far consumers seem to be
using DVRs almost identically to VCRs.
89. The only case that has decided the issue directly, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), is currently in front of the United States Supreme Court, cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 686 (2004), so the issue has not yet been definitively resolved. The district court in A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), was given the opportunity to
address this precise issue five years ago when it granted a preliminary injunction against Napster for
offering P2P network services. While the court found that A&M had demonstrated a likelihood of
prevailing at trial that justified the injunction against Napster, it left the door open for other P2P
network operators to use a Betamax defense. Id. at 927.
On appeal, the court found that the Betamax standard did not protect Napster for two reasons.
First, the appellate court accepted the district court's finding of fact that, unlike Sony, Napster had
actual and constructive knowledge of its users' direct infringement. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the appellate court was careful to explain that it
would "not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file
sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights." Id. at 1020-21 (emphasis added).
By qualifying its holding and distinguishing Sony, the court left the door open to find liability lack-
ing under the Betamax standard in future P2P cases.
The second door that the Napster appellate court left open to future P2P operators was its hold-
ing that the district court had erred by holding that Napster had not proven that its network was
currently actually used for substantial noninfringing uses. Id. at 1021. The district court's error was
that it had considered only current, actual uses of the Napster network. Id. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the lower court "improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring
the system's capabilities," when it considered the network's capability for substantial noninfringing
uses. Id. By overturning the finding that Napster's P2P network was incapable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, the Ninth Circuit once again left the door open for other network providers to use a
Betamax fair use defense, because future courts must consider not only a system's actual use, but
also its potential uses.
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issue is currently before the United States Supreme Court in the case of
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.90 Grokster offers free P2P software
to the public that allows computer users to search other Grokster users'
files and make copies of those files for themselves. 91 When a number of
film studios, authors, and record labels sued the company for contribu-
tory and vicarious copyright infringement, Grokster invoked the Be-
tamax standard as a part of its defense.92
Before the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs applied lessons from the
Sony decision to persuade the court that Grokster's software was not ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses. For example, whereas the Sony
Court explained that the plaintiffs in that case owned less than ten per-
cent of the infringed programming and had no right to prevent all other
copyright holders from authorizing home copying, the plaintiffs in Grok-
ster alleged that they owned more than seventy percent of the materials
shared with Grokster's software. 93 In the end, however, Grokster pre-
vailed in establishing that its software was capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, having also taken a lesson from Sony.94 The defendants
demonstrated to the court that their software was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses by submitting statements from a number of recording
artists and public domain distribution companies that the Grokster soft-
ware enabled authorized distribution of their works. 95 The court ex-
plained that, even if only ten percent of the use was legitimate, as the
plaintiffs alleged, the volume of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file
exchanges helped to demonstrate the capability for substantial nonin-
fringing use.96 In this way, Grokster escaped liability with the help of the
Betamax standard.97
90. 380 F.3d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
91. See generally id. at 1158-0.
92. See generally id.
93. Id. at 1158.
94. Id. at 1162.
95. Id. The court explained that the plaintiffs had misunderstood the Sony standard when they
argued that the software was primarily used for infringing activities. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, "prob-
able" use is irrelevant; capability for substantial noninfringing use is the only issue. Id.; cf In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that an important additional
factor in determining a P2P network's capability for substantial noninfringing uses is how probable
those uses are).
96. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.10.
97. Of course, the defendants in that case had to prove more than just a Betamax defense. See
discussion supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. In the Grokster case, the issue of a direct
primary infringement was not at issue. 380 F.3d at 1160. Therefore, the court focused its analysis on
Grokster's knowledge of the infringement and its material contribution. See id. at 1160-64. The
Ninth Circuit held for Grokster on both elements. Id. at 1162-63.
Having held that the Betamax standard applied, the court required plaintiffs to demonstrate that
Grokster "had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge
to prevent infringement." Id. at 1161. Reasonable knowledge and the failure to act must occur at the
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The Betamax standard transfers relatively simply to the use of digi-
tal technologies in fair uses. Even in the case of P2P networks, where
there is no analogous predigital technology, the Betamax standard has
been used to protect technologies capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. Therefore, the content industries sought other ways to maintain
their control of their copyrighted content; the result was the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act of 1998.
III. DEFENSE: THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998
Following the Betamax ruling, the industry slowly adapted and the
parties reached a new balance that promoted, at least for a time, peace
between content providers and consumers. However, the digital age
brought with it both benefits and problems for copyright law. Both the
industry and consumers wildly embraced the new digital recording tech-
nologies because consumers could purchase music with a sound quality
never before experienced by most.98 The format also made it easier for
consumers to infringe on the industry's copyrights because home digital
copying and distribution could happen at the click of a mouse, and com-
puters could generally copy media much more quickly than a home tape
recorder or VCR.99 Before content providers realized the threat, P2P
networks had popped up on college campuses across the country and
CDs were easily reproduced in the home. i° ° Copy-protection measures
were seldom used before the digital age, as the technology required to
mass copy and mass distribute copyrighted works was not generally
available to the public. 01 With the advent of the Internet, however, this
same point in time. Id. at 1162. Because the court held that Grokster had no right or ability to act to
prevent infringement, the plaintiffs notices of infringement were irrelevant as to knowledge, and
therefore the defendants did not have the requisite level of knowledge. Id. at 1162-63. As the court
observed, "even if [Grokster] closed [its] doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
While a Betamax analysis is not a factor in an analysis of the third element-material contribu-
tion-the district court also found for Grokster on that issue. Id. at 1163. Therefore, having met only
the first element of contributory infringement-a primary act of direct infringement-the court
refused to hold Grokster liable for contributory infringement. Id. at 1164.
98. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073
(9thCir. 1999).
99. See Basics About MP3 and CD-R Recording, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
http://www.angelfire.com/vt2/tommymc3/CD-R (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
100. See LITMAN, supra note 8, at 153-56.
101. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1072, and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), are the first examples of litigation involving significant amounts of copy-
ing and distribution by the public. Even in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), the consumers using VCRs did not have the ability to record and distribute content
on a significantly large scale.
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changed dramatically. Special software allowed consumers to not only
create nearly perfect copies of lawfully purchased recordings, an activity
explicitly allowed under copyright law, 10 2 but technology also allowed
them to distribute copies to hundreds or thousands of strangers across
P2P networks. 10 3
In response, content providers developed a number of tools to pro-
tect against unauthorized copying and distribution.10 4 These mechanical
and software measures protect against unauthorized mass distribution,
but are also equally effective at limiting traditional fair use and other le-
gal uses. 10 5 In turn, the consumer markets responded with new devices
that circumvent these mechanical and software protections. 10 6 Addition-
ally, while software protections put the ability to copy content out of
reach of the average consumer, clever programmers quickly developed
hacks and cracks for the technological protections"0 7 and made those
tools available to John Q. Public on the Internet. 10 8 The industry, in a
desperate attempt to stave off the threat that the digital age posed, lob-
bied hard for the DMCA. 10 9 Realizing that traditional copyright enforce-
ment may no longer adequately protect in the digital age, copyright hold-
ers lobbied for the DMCA to combat piracy even before it begins.' 11
A. Operation of the DMCA
While the DMCA dramatically changed a number of provisions of
copyright law, it also added a number of new sections to Title 17."'
Most relevant are the provisions related to fair use and circumvention of
technological copy protection. Prior to the enactment of the DMCA,
there were no laws disallowing the circumvention of technological pro-
tection." 12 The DMCA significantly amended circumvention law, and
consequently fair use law, by adding § 1201 to the Copyright Act. Sec-
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
103. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004; see also LITMAN, supra note 8, at 154-55.
104. See LITMAN, supra note 8, at 151-57.
105. See discussion infra Part IV.
106. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
107. Hacks and cracks are software tools that strip protected digital content of its security
measures or otherwise gain access to protected digital content. See Software cracking, in WIKIPEDIA:
THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software-cracking (last visited Apr. 24
2005); Hack, in id., at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hack_%28technologyslang%29 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2005).
108. See United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d I111 (N.D. Cal. 2002), for an explana-
tion of how a software circumvention tool may work and how those tools can be subsequently posted
to the Internet.
109. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 122-45.
110. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
111. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 406, 502 (2000).
112. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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tion 1201 directly addresses the circumvention of technological protec-
tion measures.1 13 The section is concerned with two particular activities:
the act of circumvention itself and the manufacture or trafficking of tools
for circumvention. 114 Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) make it illegal
to offer to the public any tool primarily designed to circumvent copyright
protections.' 15 The language of each of these two subsections is nearly
identical, 1 6 except that § 1201(a)(2) prohibits a person or entity from
trafficking tools designed to access a technologically protected work, 1 7
while § 1201(b)(1) prohibits trafficking tools designed to copy a techno-
logically protected work.' 18
While § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1) address the manufacture, sale,
or trafficking of tools designed to circumvent protections on a techno-
logically protected work, § 1201(a)(1)(A) regulates the act of circumven-
113. See § 1201.
114. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FIVE YEARS UNDER
THE DMCA, at http://www.eff.org/lP/DMCA/_unintendedconsequences.php (last visited Apr. 15,
2004); see also § 1201(a)(1), (2), (3); Corley, 273 F.3d at 435 (explaining that "Congress targeted
not only those pirates who would circumvent these digital walls .. .but also anyone who would
traffic in a technology primarily designed to circumvent a digital wall").
115:§ 1201.
116. See § 1201(a)(l), (b)(l); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUMMARY, THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/
dmca.pdf (last viewed Apr. 22, 2005).
117. Section 1201 (a)(2) of the Copyright Act reads as follows:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that is primarily de-
signed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this title; has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this title; or is marketed by that person or
another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in cir-
cumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title.
118. § 1201(b)(l) reads as follows:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that is primarily de-
signed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technologi-
cal measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work
or a portion thereof; has only limited commercially significant purpose of use other than
to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or is marketed
by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge
for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.
This provision prohibits circumvention tools aimed at copying the work. The statute itself
refers to circumventing technology that "protects a right of a copyright owner under this title." Id.
Those rights are the rights laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 106, and included among them is the exclusive
right to make and distribute copies. Because copying is the main potentially infringing use that tech-
nology allows, I will refer to this kind of circumvention, for simplicity's sake, as circumvention
protecting against unauthorized copying of a work.
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tion itself."19 Like §§ (a)(2) and (b)(1), § (a)(l)(A) maintains the distinc-
tion between circumvention for the purpose of gaining access to a work
and circumvention for the purpose of bypassing copy-protection technol-
ogy.120 Section 1201 (a)(1)(A), however, makes the act of circumvention
illegal only if it is intended to gain access to a work. 12 No provision out-
laws the act of circumvention in order to copy a protected work.122
Together, these sections allow content holders to combat piracy in
court even before a single infringement of the copyrighted work has oc-
curred. They do this by prohibiting the conduct and tools that enable in-
fringers to access and copy a work in the first place. 123 The DMCA does
not ask whether infringement has actually occurred;' 24 rather, a § 1201
violation may occur before a pirate has made or distributed a single in-
fringing copy, thus cutting off piracy at the source. 125 In fact, the DMCA
works to prevent piracy even earlier by assuring that potential pirates do
not have access to tools designed for infringement.126
Notably, nothing in the DMCA expressly changes the doctrine of
fair use. 127 In fact, the legislation itself suggests that it would have no
effect in the litigation of fair use issues. Specifically, § 1201 (c)(1) clearly
states that "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limita-
tions, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under
this title."'' 28 Also, nowhere does the DMCA reference any fair use ex-
ceptions to the prohibitions on circumvention. 129 Moreover, the DMCA
does not in any way alter § 107 as a defense to an action for infringe-
ment.130 In addition, the DMCA does not explicitly overrule the decision
in Sony.13 1 Finally, since the DMCA does not outlaw circumvention in
order to copy a work, a user could theoretically skirt the protection le-
gally to make a fair copy of the work. 132 Nevertheless, largely due to the
119. "No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title." § 1201 (a)(I)(A).
120. Id.
121. id.
122. See generally § 1201.
123. See § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (b).
124. See generally § 1201.
125. See § 1201(a)(1)(A).
126. See § 1201(a)(2), (b).
127. See generally § 1201.
128. § 1201(c)(1).
129. See generally § 1201.
130. See id.
131. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see generally
§ 1201. At least one court has found that the DMCA implicitly overrules Sony to the extent that the
terms of the DMCA are inconsistent with the rule set forth in Sony. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
132. See generally § 1201.
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§ 1201 prohibitions on both circumvention and offering tools of circum-
vention, fair use law has changed under the DMCA.
B. An Effective End To Fair Use
The most important way that the DMCA alters the concept of fair
use is by preventing a consumer, who legally cannot circumvent protec-
tion measures, from legally engaging in a fair use of a technologically
protected work. 133 Under the DMCA, consumers are unable to gain legal
access to a protected work at all in order to make a fair use of it.134 Also,
unless the consumer is a programmer with a high level of encryption or
other protection expertise, she is effectively barred from copying a work
or a portion thereof because others cannot legally offer her the tools with
which to create a fair copy. 135 The result of these seemingly innocuous
restrictions is that copyright owners can unilaterally eliminate all fair
uses of their works by implementing technology that protects against
access or copying. 136
The case of United States v. Elcom, Ltd.137 provides an example of
one way in which copyright holders have used the DMCA to keep users
from engaging in fair uses of technologically protected works. In that
case, Adobe, a digital media and software company, developed software
called "eBook," which allowed book publishers to publish books as
computer files that the consumer could then download, open with Adobe
Reader software, and then read on a computer. 38 Special technological
protections in Adobe's eBook software also allowed publishers to place
restrictions on an electronic book distributed in Adobe format, including
controls on the ability of the user to print, copy, lend to a friend, or per-
mit the ebook to be read aloud by a text to speech engine. "9 The soft-
ware also ensured that only the computer to which the ebook was origi-
nally downloaded could open a copy of the ebook. 140 These restrictions
worked by putting access and copy controls on the ebooks that, under the
DMCA, would be illegal to circumvent. 141
Consider, however, a blind person who purchases an ebook and
wishes to have the computer read the book aloud or translate the book
into Braille. Current technology can filter the book through software
133. See infra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
134. See § 1201(a)(1)(A).
135. See § 1201(b)(1).
136. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 114.
137. 203 F. Supp. 2d IIII (N.D. Cal. 2002).
138. Id. at 1117-18.
139. Id. at 1118.
140. Id.
141. See generally id.
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programs that transfer that book into a format usable for the blind per-
son. 142 Under the standard fair use analysis, this would be a fair and non-
infringing use of the work. This constitutes a fair use because, first, the
purpose and character of the blind reader's use is noncommercial-she
intends to use the translated copy only for herself. Thus, while it is true
that the nature of the copyrighted work, a book, "falls within the core of
copyright's protective purposes,"' 143 and that the reader would be copying
the entire book, the fourth fair use factor, the use of the work upon the
potential market for the original, weighs heavily in favor of fair use be-
cause allowing more readers access to a legitimately purchased copy of a
work would actually increase sales of the copyrighted work. 4 4 There-
fore, the blind reader would most likely be engaging in a legal, fair use of
the work.
However, the blind reader may only read her book legally if the
translation technology is allowed access to the original work. Section
1201(a)(1)(A) criminalizes and makes the blind reader liable for circum-
venting controls to allow her Braille or audio reading software access to
the original book. 145 Even if she could circumvent the protections legally
in order to read the work, § 1201(a)(2) criminalizes and makes software
developers liable for offering her circumvention tools. 146 Under these
circumstances, a blind purchaser of an ebook would have no access to
that work except through circumvention.
It is possible, however, that an ebook publisher did not implement
access controls on a particular publication and chose instead only to im-
plement copy controls. In this circumstance, the blind reader is still ef-
fectively disallowed fair use of the work. While no provision in the
DMCA prevents the blind reader from circumventing copy controls to
create a Braille copy of the book, 147 if this particular reader is not techno-
logically savvy and able to break the encryption or otherwise crack the
copy control on her own, she will be effectively barred from creating a
Braille copy of the work because § 1201(b) criminalizes and makes any-
one liable who offers her the tools with which to make her legal Braille
copy of the book. 148 In this example, a significant segment of the popula-
tion is denied access to the work itself, despite copyright's traditional
policy and constitutional mandate that the public benefit from the fruits
142. Seeid. at 1118-19.
143. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
145. See id. § 1201(a)(1)(A); see also United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d I1II (N.D. Cal.
2002).
146. See § 1201(a)(2); Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-20.
147. See generally § 1201.
148. § 1201(b).
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of creative labor. 149 It is this exact situation that the defendant in Elcom
faced.' 50
In Elcom, the defendant software developer, Elcomsoft, developed
a piece of software called Advanced eBook Processor that enabled users
to remove use restrictions on ebooks.' 5 ' While this software could enable
a user to engage in copyright infringement,'52 it also enabled a user to
engage in fair uses of her legally purchased ebook.153 Elcomsoft was in-
dicted under § 1201 (b)(1)(A) and (C) of the DMCA for trafficking in and
marketing its access and copy circumvention tool. 154 The district court of
the Northern District of California denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss,1 55 finding that the DMCA prohibits all circumvention tools, regard-
less of suitability for substantially noninfringing uses. 156 This result
seems less than just, but as one court has observed, "The fact that Con-
gress elected to leave technologically unsophisticated persons who wish
to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the technical
means of doing so is a matter for Congress."'' 5
7
It is true that the worst case scenario demonstrated by the facts of
Elcom could only come into play if the digitally protected format of the
book were the only form in which the book was available. However, this
has already been the case with at least one very popular work. In March
2000, Stephen King released his then-latest tale, Riding the Bullet, avail-
able only in ebook format. 5 8 Readers without access to the story because
149. See discussion supra Part 1.
150. See generally Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at I11.
151. Id. at 1118.
152. The Elcom court stated that "[t]he same technology, however, also allows a user to engage
in copyright infringement by making and distributing unlawful copies of the ebook." Id. at 1119.
This statement is misleading to the extent that it implies that the Advanced eBook Processor enables
the distribution itself. While it is true that the software allows a user to copy the ebook, distribution
requires independent, intervening action on the part of a person as well as the aid of other software
tools, such as a P2P program or a file transfer protocol program.
153. Id. at 1118.
154. Id. at 1119.
155. Id. at 1117.
156. Id. at 1124. ("Taken in combination [with § 106], § 1201(b) ... bans trafficking in any
device that bypasses or circumvents a restriction on copying or performing a work. Nothing in the
express language would permit trafficking in devices based on the uses to which the device will be
put.").
157. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). It
should also be noted that the court underestimated the range of users who would be affected by the
DCMA. It is not that the DMCA leaves technologically unsophisticated persons without the means
to make a fair use of a work; the term "unsophisticated" connotes below average sophistication, and
it is unlikely that even the average user would be able to circumvent controls on her own. Rather, it
is that the DMCA leaves all those who are not especially technologically sophisticated-most of the
population-without the technical means of making fair uses of works.
158. Demand for King eBook Makes Download Downright Impossible, CNN.coM, Mar. 15,
2000, at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/books/news/03/15/king.ebook/ (last visited Apr. 3 2005).
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of disability or other reasons, including interoperability restrictions,
would have no access whatsoever to King's work without violating the
DMCA.
Thus, the Betamax standard, though not expressly overruled by the
DMCA, 159 was overruled by it in effect. 160 It has been contended that,
because the DMCA differentiates between access-prevention measures
and copy-protection measures, circumvention for fair uses is still al-
lowed. 161 In reality, however, most consumers have neither the technical
skill nor the knowledge to circumvent copy-protection technologies on
their own without the help of tools illegally "offered to the public" under
§ 1201(b)(1). Thus, "[b]y prohibiting the provision of circumvention
technology, the DMCA fundamentally altered the landscape. A given
device or piece of technology might have 'a substantial noninfringing
use, and hence be immune from attack under Sony's construction of the
Copyright Act-but nonetheless still be subject to suppression under sec-
tion 1201. ' ' '162 Accordingly, under the DMCA's language, fair use and
the Betamax standard still exist in law, though not in fact.
C. A Need to Amend the DMCA
The DMCA has fundamentally altered the copyright landscape for
the worse by effectively failing to "Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," 16 3 as required by the Constitution. First, the DMCA stifles
the development of new and legitimate technologies that could otherwise
be put to productive and beneficial uses. Second, the DMCA chills
expression by effectively requiring a copyright holder's permission in
order to parody or criticize a work. Third, the DMCA allows one
copyright holder to dictate how another copyright holder can exercise his
§ 106 right to "do and authorize" otherwise infringing activities. Finally,
the DMCA reduces competition among content media providers.
1. The DMCA stifles the development of new
and legitimate technologies.
The DMCA stifles the development and distribution of new and le-
gitimate technologies for productive and beneficial uses simply because
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (date).
160. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (explaining that "Sony involved a construction of the
Copyright Act that has been overruled by the later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any
inconsistency between Sony and the new statute").
161. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1998, available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
162. Id. (quoting RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311,
*9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)).
163. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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a person may use that technology to circumvent controls on a work. The
case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley16 4 provides an example. In
Corley, a Norwegian teenager developed a simple program that decoded
the standard encryption, CSS, 165 on DVDs. 166 The teenager appropriately
named the program "DeCSS.', 167 Shortly thereafter, 2600.com, the online
version of the magazine 2600, published an article detailing how the
code was cracked and what the crack program did:1 68 It "facilitated the
creation of previously unavailable open source DVD players for
Linux."' 69 To supplement the article, 2600.com published the source
code of the crack program on its web site, along with several links to
other sites posting the code to DeCSS.17 0 The trial court ultimately issued
an injunction under § 1201 prohibiting 2600.com from either posting the
code itself or linking to other sites providing the code.17 1 Posting the
code itself was found to violate § 1201(a)(2)(A)'s prohibition on "offer-
ing to the public" circumvention tools, and posting a link was found to
violate the same under the "trafficking in" language. 172
The Corley defendants argued, among other things, that DeCSS
was protected by the Betamax fair use standard because it was capable of
significant noninfringing uses. 173 Namely, DeCSS could enable the de-
velopment of a CD player for the Linux operating system. 174 Congress
seemed to write this protection into the DMCA in § 1201(a)(2)(A) when
it limited liability to only those tools "primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title."' 75 In applying the
164. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
165. "CSS, or Content Scramble System, is an access-control and copy-prevention system for
DVDs developed by the motion pictures companies .... It is an encryption-based system that re-
quires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive
to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs." Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 308.
166. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 437 (2d Cir. 2001).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 439. While the magazine 2600 "cover[s] some issues of general interest to computer
users-such as threats to online privacy-the focus of the publications is on the vulnerability of
computer security systems." Id.
169. DVD Encryption Cracked, 2600.coM, Nov. 12, 1999, at http://www.2600.com/news/
view/article/20 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). This is the article at issue in the Corley case. See Corley,
273 F.3d at 429.
170. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36. Defendant David Corley is the owner of both the print and
online versions of 2600. Id. at 439 n.7.
171. Id. at 434-35.
172. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
173. Id.
174. See DVD Encryption Cracked, supra note 169.
175. 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2004).
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language of the statute, however, the Corley court distinguished between
noninfringing uses and the act of circumvention. 76 The "significant non-
infringing use" standard applied as a defense only to contributory in-
fringement.' 77 Section 1201, as the Second Circuit explained, did not
deal with contributory infringement; rather, it dealt directly with the act
of circumvention and did not concern itself with any ultimate use to
which that circumvention might be put. 7 8 The court went on to hold that,"as the legislative history demonstrates, the decision not to make fair use
a defense to a claim under § 1201(a) was quite deliberate."' 179 Therefore,
the Second Circuit found that 2600.com's linking to and posting of the
DeCSS code was a violation of § 1201 of the DMCA.8 °
The Corley ruling sets a dangerous precedent that threatens the very
creativity and development that copyright law aims to promote. As the
court in Elcom explained: "Congress sought to ban all circumvention
tools.' 8' If a developer or manufacturer cannot market, traffic in, or oth-
erwise offer to the public tools that would allow users to engage in per-
fectly legal, legitimate activities, including fair uses and the development
of new technologies, simply because those tools also have a circumven-
tion use, those developers and manufacturers will have no economic in-
centive to develop new tools at all. Developers will have no market for
goods that they cannot offer legally, and therefore they cannot benefit
from such technologies.
The lack of economic incentives is not the only problem, however.
Corley provided a specific example of a case in which the DMCA pre-
vented development because the DeCSS code enabled the development
of a DVD player for computers running the Linux operating system.' 82
Since the court banned trafficking that code, it made the code unavailable
to other developers seeking to develop either a Linux DVD player or new
technology based on the Linux DVD player. In this way, the DMCA has
impeded further technological development.
Without an economic incentive to develop new tools, developers
have at least one less reason to develop technologies that could be used
for lawful circumvention. In fact, the DMCA discourages development
of new tools because people offering those tools will be liable not only
when the primary purpose of the tool is infringement, but also when the
tool has any capability of infringing uses. If potential technology remains
176. Reinerdes, 11I F. Supp. 2d at 319.
177. See id. at 323-24.
178. Id. at 319, 322.
179. Id. at 322.
180. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454-55, 457-58 (2d Cir. 2001).
181. United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
182. See DVD Encryption Cracked, supra note 169.
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undeveloped, it begins a cycle of retardation in the development of de-
rivative technologies. Thus, other derivative tools based on the same
technology, yet developed for wholly noninfringing uses or unrelated
productive uses altogether, will remain undeveloped.
The purpose of the DMCA is "to facilitate the robust development
and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications,
research, development, and education in the digital age."' 183 However, the
DMCA actually stifles the very progress that copyright law ideally
strives to promote by hindering the development of new digital technolo-
gies for legitimate and lawful purposes. Ironically, as the court in Elcom
stated, "[tihat is part of the sacrifice Congress was willing to make in
order to protect against unlawful piracy and promote the development of
electronic commerce and the availability of copyrighted material on the
Internet."' 84
2. The DMCA chills expression.
The DMCA chills expression by requiring potential commentators
to obtain the copyright holder's permission in order to parody or criticize
a work. If copyright holders' access and copy protections are immune to
circumvention for legal purposes, a parodist or critic will be unable to
use part of an original digital copy to create the parody or criticism. The
only alternative would be to seek a license from the copyright holder,
who is not likely to grant a license for a use designed to criticize or make
fun of his valuable content. Therefore, the DMCA may effectively put
parodists and commentators at the mercy of copyright holders. A few
hypotheticals provide excellent examples.
The DMCA could prevent a commentator from making a musical
parody of another song. Consider the situation in which a musical social
commentator, such as the band 2 Live Crew, wishes to parody the classic
rock song "Pretty Woman," as was the case in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.' 85 The Campbell Court explained that this parody was a fair
use of the original work. 186 The Court's reasoning rested in part on the
fact that the allegedly infringing parody was critical of the original
song. 17
183. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
184. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. Even Richard Clarke, the head of the White House office
of cyberspace security, has recognized problems resulting from the DMCA's "chilling effect on
vulnerability research." Jonathan Band, Congress Unknowingly Undermines Cyber-Security,
MERCURYNEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/
4750224.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
185. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
186. See id. at 594.
187. See id. at 591-92.
1080 [Vol. 28:955
DMCA Overprotection Fix
Now, assume that the original recording of "Pretty Woman" had
been released to the public solely on access-protected CDs. In this situa-
tion, the parodist would be unable to access the digital copy of the music
in order to use the original as a part of the parody. This inability to access
is because, under § 1201(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), the parodist would be un-
able to access the original work in its digital form. First, § 1201 (a)(1)(A)
prohibits the parodist from circumventing the access controls. Second, §
1201(a)(2) prohibits others from offering the parodist tools with which to
circumvent those controls. Short of creating a second generation re-
cording,' 88 the parodist would be forced to seek a license from the holder
of the copyright in the original work. Thus, the original copyright holder
may withhold a license in order to dissuade critique of his intellectual
property. 189
In addition to parody uses, outright critique of media content could
face alarming obstacles under the DMCA. The DeCSS technology,
which allows for the circumvention of DVD encryption, illustrates this
situation.190 In 2004, the controversial film director Michael Moore re-
leased Fahrenheit: 9/11.191 The film was released in theaters and subse-
quently released on DVD. 192 A film critic wanting to use select short
clips of the film to criticize Michael Moore's political views or the
charged message in his film would be unable to do so without either ob-
taining a license from Mr. Moore, which he is unlikely to grant,' 93 or
employing the DeCSS code illegally to access and copy the necessary
footage. In this way, the DMCA can prevent productive criticism.
By protecting technology that effectively prevents parody and criti-
cism, the DMCA puts control over critical commentary into the hands of
the copyright holders, who have an interest in suppressing critical com-
mentary to protect the value of their content. Therefore, the DMCA po-
tentially chills the development of critical and parodic expression.
188. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001). A second-
generation recording is a recording made from another recording.
189. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
190. See supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
191. See Michael Moore (11), in IMDB, at http://www.imdb.com/name/nm06016l9/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2005).
192. See Fahrenheit 9/11 I Now Available on DVD!, at http://www.fahrenheit91 l.com (last
visited Apr. 7, 2005).
193. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works
will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very
notion of a potential licensing market.").
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3. The DMCA treads on copyright holders' rights.
The DMCA is, of course, a tool intended to protect copyright hold-
ers' rights. 194 However, for those copyright holders seeking out new
markets and new channels of digital distribution, the DMCA may actu-
ally prevent these innovative copyright holders from exercising their §
106 right "to authorize" otherwise infringing uses. 195 This would happen
because the DMCA prohibits making or "offer[ing] to the public" tools
to circumvent access or copy controls.' 9 6 The DMCA prohibits these
tools, as well as their employment,' 97 regardless of whether the copyright
holder would wish these tools to be used on their works. For example,
imagine the case of an ebook publisher. 198 Because allowing a Braille
translation program to access and copy the book for a blind reader would
also allow infringing uses, the publisher chooses to protect against the
potential infringement by enabling access and copy controls on the book.
In this case, the publisher may want the blind reader to be able to pur-
chase a copy of the ebook legally and then circumvent the protections on
her own in order to create a single Braille translation for her personal
use. After all, this means an additional sale for the publisher because it is
unlikely that the blind reader would have purchased the book otherwise,
since she would not be able to read the book without the Braille transla-
tion. However, the DMCA does not distinguish between this case and the
one in which the blind purchaser subsequently makes infringing copies
that she distributes over the Internet, 199 thereby costing the publisher
sales.
This situation demonstrates the potential of the DMCA to allow a
few copyright holders who are fearful of piracy to prohibit other copy-
right holders from authorizing desirable and even profitable uses of their
works. Just as the plaintiffs in Sony had "no right to prevent other copy-
right holders from authorizing [copying] for their programs," 2° so too
should modem copyright holders have no right to prevent other copyright
holders from authorizing circumvention for their content. Thus, the
DMCA effectively allows a few copyright holders to prevent other copy-
right holders from exercising their exclusive § 106 rights.
194. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
195. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 2002).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2000).
197. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
198. See discussion supra notes 137-163 and accompanying text.
199. The DMCA prohibits both all circumvention tools and the circumvention itself to gain
access without any mention of the use to which the consumer puts her subsequent copies. See §
1201.
200. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
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4. The DMCA reduces market competition.
The software at issue in Elcom-ebook protection circumvention
software-provides an example of ways in which the DMCA would al-
low companies to engage in unfair trade practices by restricting interop-
erability. Adobe ebooks are encoded so that only the Adobe Reader can
display them.2°' The ability to circumvent this technology would allow
users to choose which platform they prefer,2 °2 thereby creating competi-
tion among software developers to create the best product. By preventing
users from circumventing controls to gain access by other reader pro-
grams, the DMCA allows Adobe to create a market monopoly on reader
software. Therefore, if a large number of ebooks are distributed as Adobe
files, consumers have no choice but to use the Adobe Reader to read
those ebooks. This is true regardless of how poor the quality of the soft-
ware may be, what kinds of undesirable terms users may have to agree to
in order to use it, what kinds of privacy issues may accompany use of the
software, and what kinds of restraints that may create on free trade.
5. The DMCA causes harm overall.
The DMCA has effected fundamental changes to the copyright law
without making those changes expressly. In order to "Promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, 2 °3 the law must remedy the alarming
problems born with the enactment of the DMCA. The law must allow for
development of new, legitimate technologies that could otherwise be put
to productive, beneficial uses; enable expression through parody and
critical commentary; allow copyright holders to effectively exercise their
right to authorize § 106 activities; and promote competition among con-
tent media providers.
IV. THE ANSWER: Two CLAUSES
There is a simple, mutually beneficial solution to the DMCA prob-
lems. Legislation should be passed that makes minor changes to the
DMCA to allow lawful and fair uses to coexist with the copyright
holder's interest in protecting her work while counteracting the negative
effects of the DMCA,2 °4 and to change what many see as an oppressive
201. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1I11I, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
202. See id.
203. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
204. See 149 CONG. REC. H 1-02 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
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favoritism of the content industries.205 The legislation would read as fol-
lows: 20 6
FAIR USE RESTORATION.- § 1201(c) of title 17, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting before the period at the end the
following:
"and it is not a violation of this section to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure in connection with access to, or the use of, a work if
such circumvention is not for the purpose of infringing the copy-
right in the work;" and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(5) It shall not be a violation of this title to manufacture, distribute,
or make noninfringing use of a hardware or software product capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing use of a copyrighted work." 2
0 7
Merely by subjecting § 1201 to traditional fair use principles, the
amended DMCA would allow for development of new and legitimate
technologies that could otherwise be put to productive and beneficial
uses, enable expression through parody and critical commentary, allow
copyright holders to exercise their right to authorize § 106 activities, and
promote competition among content media providers.
The provisions seek to accomplish this goal in two ways. First, they
carve out an exception in the DMCA that allows circumvention when
that circumvention is for a noninfringing use, such as a fair use. The
205. See 149 CONG. REC. E20 (Jan. 8, 2003) (introducing the Digital Media Consumers'
Rights Act of 2003 ("DMCRA"), Rep. Boucher explained that "the DMCA dramatically tilted the
balance in the Copyright Act towards content protection and away from information availability").
206. This proposal is based largely on section 5 of Rep. Boucher's 2002 proposed DMCA
amendment, the DMCRA. See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2003. However, this proposal varies from Rep. Boucher's in that paragraph (1) of
this proposal focuses on the purpose of the circumvention, and Rep. Boucher's proposal focuses on
the actual result of circumvention by only outlawing circumvention that actually results in an in-
fringement. See id. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the significance of focusing on the pur-
pose of the circumvention, rather than the actual result.
207. The amended § 1201(c) of the DMCA would read:
(c) Other rights, etc., not affected.-(1) Nothing in this section shall affect rights, reme-
dies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title,
and it is not a violation of this section to circumvent a technological measure in connec-
tion with access to, or the use of a work if such circumvention is not for the purpose of
infringing the copyright in the work.
(5) It shall not be a violation of this title to manufacture, distribute, or make noninfring-
ing use of a hardware or software product capable of substantial noninfringing use of a
copyrighted work.
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amended § 1201 accomplishes this fix by explaining that "it is not a vio-
lation of this section to circumvent a technological measure in connec-
tion with access to, or the use of, a work if such circumvention is not for
the purpose of infringing the copyright in the work." Second, the provi-
sions reestablish the Betamax standard by allowing the distribution of
circumvention tools, regardless of whether those tools are used to gain
access or to copy, when those tools are capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses. The new language accomplishes this second goal by explaining
that "[i]t shall not be a violation of this title to manufacture, distribute, or
make noninfringing use of a hardware or software product capable of
enabling significant noninfringing use of a copyrighted work." The
amended DMCA is a valuable piece of legislation that ought to be en-
acted because it resolves the problems of the DMCA while maintaining
the DMCA's key benefits to copyright holders.
A. The amended DMCA would remedy the problems of the DMCA.
Under the proposed amendments, the DMCA would no longer
threaten to stifle the development of new, legitimate technologies. This is
because the language in paragraph (1), that "[i]t shall not be a violation
of this title to manufacture, distribute, or make noninfringing use of a
hardware or software product capable of enabling significant noninfring-
ing use of a copyrighted work," applies a Betamax standard to circum-
vention technologies. Thus, in the case of the online magazine 2600.com,
where the magazine made a noninfringing use of the DeCSS technology,
and assuming that the technology is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses, the magazine would have been allowed by law to post the DeCSS
code and the links to it as a supplement to its article. The DeCSS tech-
nology, as a supplement to an article about the technology, would have
been made available lawfully for others to use as a building block for
other technologies, thereby removing a significant roadblock to the de-
velopment of new technologies.
Similarly, the amended DMCA would ensure that potential paro-
dists and critics have access to the works they need in order to comment
upon those works. First, the parodist or critic would be allowed to cir-
cumvent access technologies under the amendments because "it is not a
violation of this section to circumvent a technological measure in con-
nection with access to, or the use of, a work if such circumvention is not
for the purpose of infringing the copyright in the work." Thus, because a
parody or criticism would be a fair use of the work and therefore not an
infringement of the copyright, the parodist's and critic's circumventions
would escape criminal and civil liability under the DMCA.
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The amended DMCA would also help to put the copyright holder's"right to authorize" 20 8 back in the hands of the copyright holders. Be-
cause circumvention tools capable of substantial noninfringing uses
would be permitted under the amended DMCA, 20 9 a copyright holder
wishing to allow users to make certain uses of a work that technology
would otherwise prohibit may effectively, not merely nominally, do so.
This is so because those allowed uses would be made possible by cir-
cumvention tools "capable of enabling significant noninfringing use of a
copyrighted work., 210 Thus, injecting a Betamax standard into circum-
vention law directly avoids one problem that Sony explicitly sought to
prevent: a few copyright holders suppressing technology that would al-
low other copyright holders to exercise their right to "authorize" § 106
activities.
Yet another benefit of the amended DMCA is that it solves the
DMCA problem of a reduction in market competition as a result of inter-
operability. First, paragraph (2)'s protection of circumvention tools ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses could enable the ebook reader in
the hypothetical above211 to access the ebook with a competitor's reader
software. Additionally, the user's act of circumvention would be lawful
under paragraph (1)'s provision allowing circumvention when that cir-
cumvention would not result in an infringement of the copyright, assum-
ing that the competing software does not require the creation of an unau-
thorized copy of the ebook in order to read the file.
B. The amendments retain key benefits of the DMCA
while maintaining a proper balance ofpower
between content provider and consume.
Some would argue that the amendments proposed above would take
the teeth out of three important provisions of the DMCA: the two anti-
trafficking provisions 212 and the anti-circumvention provision.213 It is true
that the DMCA provides a powerful tool against unauthorized copying
and access; it enables copyright holders to restrict any kind of copying or
access that the copyright holders deem necessary in order to protect their
valuable content.214 Under an amended DMCA, however, tools capable
of substantial noninfringing uses may also be capable of infringing uses;
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 2002).
209. See supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part III.C.4.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000).
213. § 1201(a)(1).
214. See supra Part II1.A.
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thus copyright holders would be back at square one as far as protecting
their digital content goes because the tools allowing lawful circumven-
tion would enable pirates to do exactly what the DMCA aimed to stop. 21
According to this argument, the amendments would prevent copy-
right owners from controlling illegal access to and copying of their
works because circumvention for fair use is indistinguishable from pi-
racy by whatever technology protects the content. This would provide
the public with tools not only for fair use circumvention, but also for pi-
racy. If the public is allowed to distribute and use those tools for fair use,
content owners would be in the same position they were before the
DMCA was enacted, in which they would have no effective means to
control the digital copying and distribution of their works.
The argument ultimately fails for two reasons. First, the amended
DMCA would continue to provide a valuable tool for putting an end to
infringement before it even begins. Second, any perceived loss of control
over copyrighted content is outweighed by the costs to the public of not
being able to access and fairly use copyrighted works at all.
1. The amended DMCA would continue to enable copyright
holders to stop infringement before it begins.
The amended DMCA would continue to enable copyright holders
to prevent piracy before it begins. Under the amendments, copyright
holders would no longer have absolute control of access to and copying
of their works; however, the potential for absolute control is not the only,
nor even the primary, benefit that the DMCA granted to copyright hold-
ers. In addition to disallowing all circumvention of access and copying
controls, the DMCA also made additional remedies available to copy-
right holders. For example, § 1203(a) of the DMCA created a new civil
cause of action for content providers injured by a violation of any of the
216circumvention provisions. This remedy is available whether the cir-
cumvention results in actual infringement or not.217 The amended DMCA
would not change this provision; the content holder could still enforce
circumvention violations regardless of whether or not an infringement
occurred because the amended DMCA retains the core anticircumvention
provisions.218 The only difference under the amendments is that the cir-
cumventor engaging in a fair or other lawful use of the work would be
215. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
216. "Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an
appropriate United States district court for such violation." 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000).
217. See § 1203.
218. See supra note 207.
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able to rely upon fair use as an affirmative defense. 21 9 The pirate would
not.220
The amended DMCA would still provide copyright holders with a
cause of action against infringers, or even potential infringers, for cir-
cumvention violations. Before the DMCA, a copyright holder's strongest
remedy to prevent infringement was the infringement action itself.22 1 In
the case of equipment manufacturers, vicarious liability was an available
cause of action.222 However, an action based on infringement or contribu-
tory infringement arises only after the work has been infringed because
one of the elements of copyright infringement is actual infringement of a
work.223 Therefore, a major benefit to copyright holders under the
DMCA is that it provides copyright holders with a cause of action that
prevents infringement before any infringement occurs, thereby securing
greater protection of their works by preventing the threatened harm. The
DMCA accomplishes this in § 1201, which gives a copyright holder a
cause of action against a potential infringer who circumvents controls in
order to infringe, but who does not accomplish infringement; 224 the copy-
right holder need not prove actual infringement. 225 Section 1201 allows a
copyright holder to enjoin a manufacturer from distributing tools for cir-
cumventing access and copying controls before the manufacturer takes
his product to market and before the harm has actually been done.226 This
section also allows a copyright holder to enjoin and receive damages for
the act of circumvention itself, whether or not that circumvention results
in actual infringement.2 27
The amended DMCA would continue to allow copyright holders
these additional causes of action to protect against the harm of potential,
as distinct from actual, infringement. Under the amendments, a copyright
holder could sue a pirate for violating the circumvention provisions of
the DMCA even before the pirate copies or distributes unauthorized cop-
ies of the work.228 This is so because the amendments focus on the pur-
pose of the circumvention, and do not require proof of actual infringe-
219. See id.
220. See id.; OVERVIEW OF THE DIGITAL MEDIA CONSUMERS' RIGHTS ACT, available at
http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/dmcrahandout.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
221. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
222. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
223. See id. at 435 n.17 (explaining that a direct infringement is an element of contributory
liability); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.1 (2d ed. 1996) ("To prevail in an action for copy-
right infringement, a plaintiff must prove ... that the defendant copied from plaintiff's work.").
224. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
225. See id. § 1008.
226. See id. § 1201.
227. See id.
228. See supra notes 223-227
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ment.229 In this way, the content owners' ability to prevent potential in-
fringement is not hindered under the amendments and they retain the
benefits granted under the DMCA. The amendments would merely man-
date consideration of the Betamax standard in these preemptive and addi-
tional causes of action, a standard that would have already been applied
to the same infringement action had the harm, or copying and distribu-
tion, actually occurred.2 3 °
2. The amendments benefit both consumer and content providers.
The amended DMCA benefits both consumers and copyright hold-
ers by providing a legal framework that would allow the traditional pur-
chasing patterns of consumers to continue. The law of any culture shapes
behavior within the culture that it governs. 231 The case is no different
with regard to copyright law and the behavior of consumers subject to
that law.232 Throughout much of recording technology history, consum-
ers have been able to legally space- 233 and time-shift their content for
personal use. 2 34 The continued availability of lawful space- and time-
shifting ensured under the amended DMCA will benefit consumers and
content providers alike.
Consumers benefit by the ability to continue space- and time-
shifting, thereby reducing consumer costs. With the ability to circumvent
lawfully for the purpose of space- and time-shifting, consumers are able
to make free use of their purchased works for a single price. In 1992,
229. See supra note 228.
230. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
231. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463,
469 (1998).
232. Megan E. Gray & Will Thomas DeVries, The Legal Fallout from Digital Rights Manage-
ment Technology, 4 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 20, 20-21 (2000).
233. Space-shifting is the process of transferring content from one form of media to another.
By this process, a consumer could purchase an audio CD and convert it into an MP3 to listen to on
his or her computer or MP3 player, record it to a cassette tape to listen to in the car, or put a pro-
tected copy on her personal server to listen to on a different computer. See A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), for an example of space-shifting across the Internet.
234. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000). Section 1008 provides:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the
manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital au-
dio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or
based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making
digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.
See also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that ripping MP3s from a personal copy of a legally acquired compact disc and copy-
ing them to a portable MP3 player facilitates personal use under the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 and that such space-shifting is analogous to time-shifting in Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)).
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Congress first explicitly authorized private home recording. 35 Congress
also required that blank media have included in the sale price a royalty
payable to content providers236 to compensate for private copies made. 37
This measure allows consumers to pay a single fee for blank media that
includes a royalty payment for all of their home taping and copying
needs. Therefore, the consumer is able to pay a single low royalty rate
for her private, lawful uses rather than a separate fee for each and every
use she may wish to make. Paying only once affords the consumer flexi-
bility in her uses of lawfully acquired copies of works, and in this way
the music itself is not all that consumers purchase; they also realize a
benefit from the many potential uses of lawful circumvention.
This capability benefits copyright holders, who can sell copies of
their content and still receive payment for private, lawful copies made
without having to anticipate and market every potential use to which a
consumer may want to put a copyrighted work. The copyright holders
benefit by the increased marketability of products that are useful to a
number of different consumers in a number of different settings. The
consumer can purchase a music CD and, through lawful circumvention
under an amended DMCA, lawfully copy it to his computer to listen to
from the hard drive.238 Without giving consumers freedom to circumvent
access and copy controls, the record label will have to provide copies in
many different file formats to reach its entire potential market. Whereas
one consumer may want an MP3 format, another may use a player re-
quiring a WMA format, and a third may require OGG or FLAC file for-
mats.239 Offering products in a potentially infinite number of different
incarnations would result in record or distribution companies incurring
increased costs to manufacture and market the different formats. Logi-
cally, then, by marketing a single CD product to the entire potential mar-
ket and then allowing the users to choose their formats through lawful
circumvention, the content providers both lower their own distribution
and marketing costs and avoid the risk of ousting potential purchasers
seeking formats either not offered or not yet discovered by the content
providers.
An amended DMCA would remedy this problem by allowing con-
sumers to continue to freely consume works privately in a variety of
235. See § 1008.
236. Id. §§ 1003, 1004.
237. See H.R. REP. 102-873(I), at 15-16 (1998).
238. See § 1008.
239. Each of these is an example of a different kind of audio file format. See Audio codec, in
WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audio-codec (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005); List ofcodecs, in id., at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of codecs (complete list of
currently available audio filed formats) (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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formats. Content providers would benefit by maintaining the marketabil-
ity of their works while still engaging technological protections that pre-
vent mass piracy.
C. An amended DMCA is effective and valuable.
As amended, the DMCA would continue to provide content holders
with valuable protection against both actual and potential infringements
by retaining the anticircumvention language of § 1201. At the same time,
subjecting the DMCA to a Betamax standard would fix a number of
problems with lawful uses that have arisen under the DMCA. Addition-
ally, an amended DMCA would provide economic benefits to consumers
and content providers alike by enabling consumers to make lawful uses
of copyrighted works for a single price and enabling content providers to
protect against piracy while maintaining a broad market for copies of
their works.
V. CONCLUSION
The response of copyright law to the ever-changing technological
landscape keeps the music industry in a state of flux and promises to do
so in the future. In the past, courts have dealt with the ups and downs of
the delicate balance between the public's interest in creative works and
the copyright holder's property interest by developing doctrines such as
fair use and the Betamax standard. These doctrines mitigate many of the
potentially harsh and unfair effects of overly broad copyright protection.
Since its enactment, however, the DMCA has caused a major shift
in the delicate balance of interests essential to a fair copyright system.
This shift is a result of the DMCA allowing content providers to effec-
tively eliminate fair uses of a work, thus limiting the application of the
Betamax standard. On the one hand, the DMCA puts a disproportionate
amount of power into the hands of copyright holders to control how,
when, why, and where their works are used. On the other hand, allow-
ances for fair uses and other lawful uses in § 1201 of the DMCA may
deprive copyright holders of some of their newly acquired defenses
against unauthorized copying and distribution in the digital age. In this
digital age, the balance cannot remain the same and it will tip one way or
the other with or without additional legislation. A look at the conse-
quences of failing to amend the DMCA demonstrates the need for a
change to protect both consumer and industry interests.
The amended DMCA would tip the scales back into equilibrium by
allowing users access to both the works themselves and the tools neces-
sary to engage in fair uses. It would guarantee consumers the ability to
engage in fair use and other legal uses of a work. It would also guarantee
10912005]
1092 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:955
them access to circumvention tools capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. The amendments do this all without immobilizing the effectiveness
of the DMCA because copyright holders could still protect against poten-
tial infringement and are still provided with additional remedies. An
amended DMCA will ultimately prove to be an invaluable piece of legis-
lation that will help restore the traditional balance of interests in copy-
right law and benefit copyright holders and consumers alike.
